We simulate social network games of a portfolio selection to analyze how knowledge, preferences of agents and their level of omniscience affect their decision-making. The key feature of the paper is that preferences and the level of omniscience of agents very much determine the ways agents make their decision. While omniscient agents respond very rapidly to the changing market conditions, non-omniscient agents are more resistant to such changes. By introducing one-time shock, we found that its efficiency depends on the level of omniscience of agents, with much stronger efficiency under omniscient agents.
Introduction
Developments on financial markets can generally be characterized by the following: uncertainty, seeking for information, and social networks, while key elements are an individual with his knowledge, preferences and other personal characteristics, and information about the assets. Individuals on the markets are non-omniscient agents in the sense that they possess only "small bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge" (Hayek 1945, 519) . 1998). Different knowledge, preferences and other specific characteristics of agents mean that despite identical data people make different expectations (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Hirshleifer 2002 ). This means that despite agents are prone to copying more profitable strategies, tradeoff between the efficiency and complexity of strategies and the desire to take as simple strategies as possible might lead them to take less profitable ones, as well (Rubinstein 1998 ).
Very often phenomena on the markets are shocks that are especially connected with stock bubbles and crashes (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003) . As regards shocks, it is important how fast agents on markets perceive them, if they perceive them, how persistent they are and how effective they are. We tackle these questions through simulations using different levels of omniscience and attitudes towards risk of agents. 1 We avoid using terms rational and irrational behavior and consider them inappropriate, as the ultimate goal of individuals is always to satisfy their goals (Mises 1996 , Rand 1964 ). If A is preferred to B and B to C, logically A should be preferred to C. But if C is preferred to A, this regards the fact that two acts of an individual can never be synchronous as value judgments are not immutable (Mises 1996, 103 According to their initial preferences, agents are split into two groups; the first consists of those who prefer Citigroup stocks, and the second of those who prefer 
( ) and CSr , are exogenous to the agents and agents cannot foresee them, neither do they know the system how prices change in time.
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We also introduce the level of non-omniscience of agents denoted 0 1 κ ≤ ≤ . It is defined through Fermi logistic probability function (Szabó and Tőke 1998) as
This means that in every time period t an agent i A chooses one of the agents to which he his directly connected, j A , and compares his payoff, Once agents lose a link to a particular strategy, they are not able to get it back in future and cannot choose such strategy again.
Finally, we put one-time shock into the stock of Citigroup in time 2 t = by lowering the return of a stock by 500 bps, ceteris paribus. Thus, instead of a positive return of 3.165 percentage points we apply a loss of 1.835 percentage points.
Data
We used data from finance.yahoo. shares of agents playing each strategy in a game with a shock. We presence of a shock is denoted with bold in the third line of the second column. The coefficient of the return under the shock needs to be reduced by 500 bps to 0.9817 . Again, we see that the shock disturbs conditions on the market significantly, for which it affects the decision-making of agents very much, while it is persistent throughout the game (see also Table 2 ). When comparing the two figures above, we see that a shock does not have an influence on the decision-making, as it was the case in the games of omniscient agents. Table 3 represents a comparison of developments of the two games in some early stages. 
Concluding remarks
It has been demonstrated that effects that shocks have on decision-making of agents on financial markets largely depend on the levels of omniscience of agents.
Omniscient agents very quickly respond on the market conditions with a one timeperiod lag, while non-omniscient agents do not. Despite omniscient agents overcome it, introduction of a shock has huge long-run consequences, as it changes the inter-game conditions, leading us to a butterfly-effect in financial decision-making.
It has also been proved that information channels, i.e. positions of agents in social networks, are of a decisive importance in the process of decision-making of
